“Government-orchestrated retail competition in electricity largely failed. With that failure came the return of regulatory-mandated, utility-administered wasteful energy efficiency programs. This time the programs carried the added justification of countering global warming.”

Prior to the oil shocks of the 1970s, energy was just another input in the management of capital, labor and other operating costs. Tradeoffs were made between energy costs and capital spent to increase efficiency. During the natural turnover of capital equipment, energy efficiency improved along with productivity, quality and waste reduction. Effective energy use was a technical matter where efficiency had to make economic sense.

Oil  and  gas  shortages in  the  1970s  were caused  by  government  price controls, but the news media hyped the concept of “running out” of resources. This brought politics into the use of energy, an example of how the problems from government intervention can breed more intervention.…

“It is no coincidence that a breakthrough in unconventional hydrocarbons (i.e., shale oil, shale gas, oil sands, and coalbed methane) should have taken place in some of the most economically free countries of the world, such as the United States, Canada, and Australia. The combination of secure property rights, transparent and efficient regulation, a favorable tax regime, and minimal red tape made it possible.”

“One of the main obstacles to economic growth and social development in many resource economies is rent-seeking. It is not a unique feature of resource economies, but it does appear to have a particularly strong effect on them and to produce institutional weaknesses.”

– Peter Kaznacheev, Curse or Blessing? How Institutions Determine Success in Resource-Rich Economies, Cato Policy Analysis No. 808 (January 11, 2017)

This new study by Peter Kaznacheev, who is Senior Research Fellow at the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA) in Moscow, valuably interprets mineral resource theory in light of institutions (read: market versus government control).…

“Newly confirmed EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt and the Trump Administration are encouraging states to solve their own problems. Coal-related controversies like these offer many states and communities excellent opportunities to find novel solutions that recognize sound science, hidden agendas, often limited options, and undesirable repercussions of poorly informed policy decisions. Let’s hope they are up to the task.”

Preventing ruptures and spills is primarily a function of selecting, building, and maintaining the best possible ash landfill facilities. A much more vital and fundamental issue involves alleged toxicity risks. Anti-coal activists insist the risks are unacceptably high; sound science says otherwise. (Also see Part I yesterday)

Like the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), North Carolina sets allowable Cr-6 limits at 100 ppb for drinking water (equivalent to 100 seconds in 33 years or 4 cups in 660,000 gallons of water). …

“A consortium of grant seekers, organized under the name ‘Aqua Ventus,’ vies for $40 million in Department of Energy grants to build a demonstration wind project within three miles of Monhegan Island. They do so under the higher moral purpose of saving the planet, but that is simply to camouflage what is but a callous quest for ‘free’ government money, taxpayers and ratepayers be damned.”

Will the new, improved US Department of Energy (DOE) just-say-no to a massively uneconomic proposed wind project offshore?

I call your attention to a situation in Maine which I believe is a poster child for how the forgotten American is being robbed and disrespected by the renewable-energy special interests and their coterie of shills. The issue is this: DOE is presently considering grants of $40 million for a project which would never exist absent tax-and-spend government largesse to this point.…