“Beginning in late 1926, the rapid development of the large Seminole field in Oklahoma made the pendulum swing the other way. Voluntary proration­ was first tried with little success. Local producers appealed to the Oklahoma Corporation Commission for compulsory action. Output of one‑half million barrels per day was driving prices down, which threatened many firms.”

Mandatory proration, a government intervention re­stricting open‑flow production to a predetermined “market demand,” began almost simultane­ously in the sister oil states of Oklahoma and Texas in 1927. Other important oil states followed – except for California and Illinois that either practiced voluntary production cutbacks or none at all. [1]

California’s  free-market position did not result from free-market ideology; it was the victory of integrated Standard Oil of California (now Chevron) over the dogged mandatory-proration lobbying of their non-integrated rivals.…

“There has been pretence that there is no evidence of harm at the levels of infrasound and low-frequency noise being emitted. This is untrue. There is an extensive body of research conducted by NASA and the US Department of Energy 30 years ago, which: established direct causation of sleep disturbance and a range of physiological effects euphemistically called ‘annoyance’,”

– Dr. Sarah Laurie CEO, Waubra Foundation. Testimony before the Australian Senate Select Committee on Wind Turbines, June 29, 2015.

Considerable evidence of negative effects to health was recorded during the Australian Senate’s call for testimonies and evidence to its Select Committee on Wind Turbines.

The following testimony of Dr. Sarah Laurie, complementing the testimony reproduced yesterday by Robert McMurtry at MasterResource, contradicts that of Australian Wind Alliance national co-ordinator Andrew Bray who testified that people living near wind facilities experience no health problems.…

“There is evidence that experience reduced the scope and se­verity of earlier errors [with the Strategic Petroleum Reserve]–that the 1981–84 perfor­mance was superior to the 1977–79 performance. But new facets of the pro­gram have brought new problems.”

“Combined with the $5 per barrel handling and storing expense [as of 1984], the overall market value of SPR oil is billions of dollars less than its embedded average cost of over $35 per barrel.”

A sacred cow of U.S. energy policy is the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. The case for the reserve assumes that another energy crisis lies around the corner, the reserve will be efficiently managed during the crisis to alleviate the emergency, and private inventories and entrepreneurship alone would be inadequate. The reserve is seen by proponents as the nation’s insurance policy against the inherent instability of the world oil market.…

“In the first week of the program, three sites in Louisiana were acquired by the Corps of Engineers by emi­nent domain. Pipeline right-of-way was similarly acquired; appraisals below industry standards made condemnation necessary. This, however, did not reduce costs or trim start­-up time as intended. The associated legal proceedings increased costs and created delay, and condemnation set the stage for polit­ical trading between Louisi­ana and federal officials in Washington, D.C.”

In the first decades of the twentieth century, fears of an imminent exhaus­tion of oil led to petroleum land withdrawals and the reserva­tion of oil-rich acreage for future military use. Four Naval Petroleum Reserves were set aside between 1912 and 1923. [1] With the discovery of major new oil fields in Oklahoma, Texas, and California in the late 1920s, the new fear – at least for the vested parts of the oil industry – became oversupply.…