“What is being proposed for Kentucky is disastrous – disastrous for our declining coal economy and equally disastrous for our very important manufacturing economy. The EPA claimed that it listened to the comments received on the proposed rule for the Clean Power Plan. It is clear from the emissions numbers the EPA has set for Kentucky that the agency did not listen to us.”

Democratic Kentucky Governor Steve Beshear (above) sounds a lot like Mitch McConnell. Kentucky’s energy way-of-life is threatened, and the news is not good for the other states that have grown up using coal as low-cost, reliable fossil-fuel generation.

The new formulation puts an upper bound on a state target of 1,305lb/MWh (for those states with 100% coal generation in their mix).  This has jammed a number of states whose rate was higher than this upper bound under the Proposed formulation, namely; Kentucky, North Dakota, Montana, Wyoming, West Virginia, Indiana, Missouri, Kansas, Nebraska, and Ohio.…

“There is evidence that experience reduced the scope and se­verity of earlier errors [with the Strategic Petroleum Reserve]–that the 1981–84 perfor­mance was superior to the 1977–79 performance. But new facets of the pro­gram have brought new problems.”

“Combined with the $5 per barrel handling and storing expense [as of 1984], the overall market value of SPR oil is billions of dollars less than its embedded average cost of over $35 per barrel.”

A sacred cow of U.S. energy policy is the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. The case for the reserve assumes that another energy crisis lies around the corner, the reserve will be efficiently managed during the crisis to alleviate the emergency, and private inventories and entrepreneurship alone would be inadequate. The reserve is seen by proponents as the nation’s insurance policy against the inherent instability of the world oil market.…

“Forced use of higher-cost U.S.-flag vessels has benefitted domestic water carrier firms, shipbuilding companies, and associated labor. This advantage, however, has been diluted because inflated shipping costs has reduced the attractiveness of barge and tanker transport compared to other alternatives.”

The current debate over legalization of oil exports is intertwined with cabotage (water vessel) protectionism. The previous two posts (Part I; Part II) examined the history of oil-export regulation by the federal government; this post surveys water-vessel restrictions from Washington, D.C., that directly or indirectly impact the oil trade.

In 1808 and 1817, the United States passed legislation reserving coastwise and intercoastal trade to U.S.-built and registered vessels. [1] Section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, commonly known as the Jones Act, reaffirmed this policy and extended it to the noncontiguous U.S.…

“The time has come to end the long debate over national energy policy in the United States and to put ourselves solidly on the road to energy independence. … This bill is only the beginning.”

– President Gerald Ford, December 22, 1975, upon signing the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 into law.

With oil shortages in the 1970s, exports of domestic oil became of acute political interest. Regulation was accomplished under two laws: the Export Administration Act of 1973 and the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975. The rise of Alaskan North Slope Oil, in addition, inspired specific export regulation that not only reflected concerns about domestic supply but special privilege for United States shipping interests. [1]

Export Administration Act

With first sales of crude and product transactions in U.S. …