Why is the Party in Power So Fearful of Copenhagen? (Is a 'death spiral' for climate alarmism ahead?)
[Editor note: Ken Green was a Working Group 1 expert reviewer for the United Nations' Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 2001]
For weeks now, we’ve been hearing an odd refrain from the Democrats who are pushing hardest for the Waxman-Markey climate bill. They are determined, it seems, not only to have such a bill drawn up before Copenhagen, but to have it signed into law. At the same time, the EPA is widely expected to issue its endangerment finding for greenhouse gases, triggering what will undoubtedly be a hotly disputed regulatory process.
President Obama, it is reported, wants to sign climate legislation before the critically important Copenhagen climate conference in December. And Senate Majority leader Harry Reid wants the President to sign a climate bill this fall as well.
They both have plenty of company in the “act first, think later” brigade.
A New York Times article shows the sense of urgency:
“I think we’re still a ways away from a final agreement which will lead to a bill,” Sen. Robert Casey (D-Pa.) said during an Aug. 11 teleconference with United Steelworkers President Leo Gerard. “But we have, I believe, at least on the Democratic side, a significant consensus on the urgency of — the need for a climate change bill — the urgency to get it done this year, as well as, I think, a good bit of consensus, even region to region, that the House was able to work out accommodating a lot of different interests in their bill.”
Sen. Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania, another Democrat seen as instrumental in moving the climate bill, said he planned to back Reid and President Obama in advancing the cap-and-trade bill.
At an Aug. 14 conference in Pittsburgh, Specter said he generally would support cloture — or cutting off a Republican-led filibuster — on everything from climate to labor and health care bills.
Senate Majority Whip Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) told Bloomberg Television on Aug. 10 that the U.N. climate conference was one driver for fall or winter action on the climate bill.
“The president has urged us to do this so that we’ll have credibility at Copenhagen,” Durbin said.”
Agriculture Secretary Vilsack, and Commerce Secretary Gary Locke are also on board. As Reuters reports,
“The United States needs to set a very firm and clear example if we are to be successful in getting the other countries to be equally aggressive in addressing climate change,” Locke said.
Vilsack warned against delays for the climate bill.
“How are we going to be able to move other nations in the same direction we want to move on trade issues or on fighting extremists if we can’t deliver on climate change, when the rest of the world is moving forward?” he asked.
What’s fascinating here is the implication of this rush to get legislation signed into law before Copenhagen. Normally, when one is going into negotiations, one wants to have some leverage to use to gain cooperation and compromise from other parties. Thus, one could see the Democrats wanting legislation passed through the Congress, but UNSIGNED by the President, as a negotiating lever for the Copenhagen talks. Similarly, one could see the President telling his EPA administrator to hold off on their endangerment finding, again, to create leverage in Copenhagen. Alternately, if the Senate held off on passing a bill, the Obama negotiating team in Copenhagen could play “good cop/bad cop,” with the House acting as “good cop,” having passed legislation, while the Senate, which has previously derailed climate policy acting as “bad cop,” waiting to see what China and India do.
But instead, the Obama Administration and their Congressional supporters are hell bent in pre-emptive capitulation at Copenhagen, going into negotiations having completely stripped themselves of leverage by having set either a legislative or regulatory process (or both) in motion that, under the U.S. legal system, is likely to be irreversible.
The only way to make sense of the Democratic strategy is to suppose that the Democrats believe that Copenhagen will fail, that China and India will not sign onto meaningful emission-reduction efforts, and that in the post-Copenhagen environment that would ensue, it would be more difficult – if not impossible – to pass a cap-and-trade scheme at all.
Try to imagine a “post-Kyoto world” without a replacement for the (failed) Kyoto Protocol:
- Neither the public nor the Senate will buy unilateral U.S. action to reduce greenhouse emissions, meaning that the prospects of cap-and-trade in 2010 and beyond grow very dim;
- As hopes for a Gore-style “wrenching transformation” fade, more mainstream scientists and opinion-makers will become more “practical” toward the issue, meaning that alarmism may give way to sensible assessments of mitigation, adaptation, and geo-engineering; and
- Exploding emissions from China and India will make developed world emissions less and less important, a fact that will become relevant in future domestic efforts to impose curbs on greenhouse gas emissions.
The end might be in sight for the mighty effort of the environmental left to put a cap on capitalism by capping carbon. What will this mean for the Malthusian worldview? We can only wait and see.
Joe Romm, at Climate Progress, not surprisingly disagrees with my thinking that we’ll have a bill signed by December. According to Joe,
“Now it is officially impossible to imagine a Senate vote before November. And I’d say it’s now at most 50-50 the vote isn’t until December or January, which would put a final bill, conferenced and passed again by both House and Senate, on Obama’s desk maybe in March.”
On the other hand, he seems to agree that holding off on signing such an agreement would help lever China into accepting binding emission-reduction plans, writing:
“Now I’m told by a non-government source who spends a lot of time talking to the Chinese about climate and clean energy that China is prepared to make such an announcement, but probably not until Obama visits the country after the APEC meeting in mid-November. If this is true, then administration and Senate leaders should delayed a final Senate vote until after that.” And
“I see little point in a final Senate vote before China spells out at least some of what it is planning to do.”
While Joe has some valid points in his post, I still think this could play out either way. As Joe and I agree, there’s only one shot at this. The question is, does that shot have to be taken before Copenhagen, or can it be taken afterward?