Historian, professor and author Burton Folsom in his book, The Myth of the Robber Barons, makes an important distinction between “market entrepreneurs” and “political entrepreneurs.” Market entrepreneurs compete by utilizing their own funds, resources and private investment in an effort to create and market a superior product. Political entrepreneurs, on the other hand, fund their business models off of government subsidies, federal protections and vote buying.

This is a useful distinction to keep in mind when evaluating the perverse outcomes of the subsidized U.S. ethanol industry where the participants consist mainly of political entrepreneurs.

Baker Institute (Rice University) Study

Corn-based ethanol and other U.S. feedstock biofuels programs are not supportable on economic, environmental nor logistical grounds. That is the conclusion of a recent comprehensive study by Rice University’s James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Fundamentals of a Sustainable Biofuels Policy. This report was previously cited by Ms. Caroline Boin in her recent post, in which she correctly labels the U.S. biofuels program a “scam” and little more than a sop to farm lobbies and corporate agri-business interests. In short, the Baker Institute study represents a clear indictment of the nonsense that passes for federal energy policy.

One key recommendation from the study is that Congress reconsider its biofuels volume mandates outlined in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007.

EISA called for production targets of 9 billion gal/year of biofuels in 2008 increasing to 36 billion gal/year by 2022. Corn ethanol is capped at 15 billion gal/year of this total but even that will be nearly impossible to reach due to significant logistical and commercial barriers that exist (aside from the fact that virtually no environmental benefits are derived from ethanol).

The Baker study identifies multiple reasons to question achievability of mandated volumes, claims of energy independence and alleged environmental benefits cited by ethanol advocates. A few are outlined below.

Subsidies, Tax Credits and Protectionism for Ethanol “Political Entrepreneurs”

Ms. Boin previously highlighted the study’s revelation that a whopping $4 billion in 2008 subsidies were required to replace a miniscule 2% of U.S. gasoline supplies. The first logical reaction is how a program could deliver so little bang for the buck, especially when “energy independence” is supposedly one of its cornerstone objectives.

Part of the answer to this embarrassing substitution level can be linked to previous Congressional and EPA miscues. Many readers may recall the introduction of MTBE (methyl tertiary butyl ether) in the late 1990s as an EPA-approved additive to gasoline. It was approved to blend with gasoline in order to attain new federally mandated specifications to oxygenate gasoline in order to meet more stringent air quality standards. MTBE turned out to be fraught with detrimental environmental effects. It was determined to be easily soluble in water and toxic. Its eventual presence in groundwater systems raised red flags and its use was abandoned under threat of product liability lawsuits.

Thus, a large portion of current ethanol production must go to replace MTBE as an additive. The Baker Institute study notes that in 2009 the U.S. produced ethanol at a run rate of about 10.4 billion gallons annually, mainly from corn. However, about 6 billion gallons per year are needed to replace MTBE as a blending agent, leaving only about 40% of annual production to displace gasoline. Further, even this meager substitution level is overstated. Why? The study points out that ethanol has a lower energy content than traditional gasoline, requiring more fuel to travel an equivalent distance. Thus, there is no gallon-for-gallon substitution ratio of ethanol to gasoline. Therefore, ethanol is only displacing about 185,000 b/d of gasoline compared to an average 9 million b/d demanded. Ethanol fails on the “energy independence” argument.

To fully appreciate the total subsidized cost of ethanol, one must take into account both federal tax credits provided to blenders and tariffs imposed on imported sugarcane ethanol. Blenders originally received a $0.51/gal. direct tax credit which was reduced to $0.45/gal in the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008. According to the study, about $3.2 billion in tax credits were provided to blenders in 2007. This meant that an incredible 76% of all funds allocated by the federal government for all renewable energy projects went to gasoline blenders to support the introduction of ethanol into the transport fuel market.

Regarding tariffs, it is widely known that sugarcane based ethanol is superior in terms of energy content and on average 30% cheaper to produce. Brazil is the world’s largest sugarcane producer and produces large amounts of ethanol for both domestic consumption and export. Brazil is now the world’s largest exporter of ethanol.

Too bad the U.S. doesn’t see much of Brazil’s surplus. The basic economic concept of comparative advantage alone would dictate that the U.S. end its corn-based ethanol program immediately and import sugarcane ethanol, saving our economy billions of dollars. Instead, the inefficient and economically and environmentally damaging corn ethanol program is subsidized then protected from more desirable product. This is the triumph of politics over economic common sense.

The current tariff on imported sugarcane ethanol is $0.54/gal. plus an additional 2.5% ad valorem tax. Given the advantageous production cost differential between sugarcane ethanol vs. corn ethanol, the tariffs ensure corn ethanol gets the priority. It also ensures the U.S. economy and taxpayer become poorer so farm-related special interests can thrive.

Logistical Barriers

Now that our government has heavily subsidized and protected ethanol as a fuel source, its use should be fairly ubiquitous, right? Wrong. When one creates a distorted “market” the unintended consequences and miscalculations are sure to be plentiful. In addition to an inability to meet mandated production volumes outlined above, transportation costs, supply bottlenecks and other logistical impediments keep many states from being able to increase their ethanol consumption.

Since production of ethanol is concentrated in the Midwest, distribution systems to other parts of the country, especially the coasts, where most of the nation’s gasoline is consumed, are not developed. As a result, the study points out that the majority of states in areas farthest from the Midwest have not achieved recommended 10% ethanol content levels. In fact, as of 2008, not one region of the country achieved the average of 10% ethanol motor fuel use. Removing tariffs on sugarcane-based ethanol could solve this deficiency, especially at the coasts of the U.S., where the major ports located.

The study notes that gasoline is transported very cheaply around the U.S. via pipelines from refineries to local distribution centers where trucks are loaded for short-range delivery to local stations or directly to industrial consumers. The study points out there are an estimated 160,868 miles of liquid petroleum pipelines for transport of traditional fuels. The extensive system means traditional gasoline can be transported for pennies per barrel. By contrast, zero ethanol is shipped via this same economical system in the U.S. due to fuel quality and pipeline integrity concerns. Instead, ethanol transport is handled by rail (60%), trucks (30%) and barge (10%) further adding to the cost of delivered product.

In addition, aside from the major distribution infrastructure deficiencies, our federal policy geniuses failed to consider an even more basic impediment to exceeding 10% ethanol-blended fuels: Automobile manufacturers will not extend warranties on engines or parts in vehicles that use more than 10% ethanol content in fuel. The only exception is flex-fuel vehicles (FFV) designed to run on E-85 (85% ethanol content). Unfortunately, FFVs represented only 3% of the car fleet as of March 2009. Oops.

Environmental Benefits Lacking

Alleged environmental benefits of ethanol are mostly unfounded. Studies reveal that the production and use of ethanol are not carbon neutral, whether corn-based or other cellulosic fuels are used. As noted earlier, evidence shows that existing biofuels provide no performance improvement over traditional gasoline and once land use changes are taken into account, there is no basis to support ethanol on environmental grounds. In addition, the amount of acreage required to be devoted to growing corn in order to meet volume mandates carries its own negative environmental impacts including groundwater contamination from fertilizer runoff which threaten ecosystems and fisheries along the Mississippi River and the Gulf of Mexico.

Conclusion

Ethanol production is economically unsound and makes the U.S. poorer as a result. It is arguably one of the most heavily subsidized energy programs of all times. The huge diversion of funds and resources to protect and prop up an industry that on balance degrades the environment, does not make us less dependent on foreign energy, and cannot deliver on volume mandates is a dysfunctional energy policy.

In private industry, when few to zero of one’s stated objectives for a major project are achieved, while burning through an organization’s resources, you are typically fired. But under the perverse incentive system of government, lacking accountability and with few repercussions for failure, even when documented on a massive scale, it’s more likely one will receive a budget increase to implement new mandates to “correct” the previous failures.

Albert Einstein is credited with stating; insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result. U.S. biofuels policy is eminently qualified as insane.

——————–

William Griesinger (B.S., Indiana University; MBA, Ball State University) is a director with BlueCrest Capital Finance in Chicago. His background includes all facets of business development, loan structuring, credit underwriting, transaction approvals and legal documentation, portfolio management, and loan work out and restructuring experience within the corporate banking, commercial finance and technology finance industries. Energy is one of his primary sectors of interest.

Mr. Griesinger’s public-policy interests include tax policy, education, energy, and the environment. This is his first blog at MasterResource.

Defending the IPCC consensus regarding natural-versus-anthropogenic climate change is Gerald R. North, Distinguished Professor of the Physical Section, Department of Atmospheric Sciences and the Department of Oceanography at Texas A&M University.

Richard S. Lindzen, the Alfred P. Sloan Professor of Meteorology at the Massachusetts of Technology, will challenge the IPCC consensus, arguing that real-world climate sensitivity lies below the iconic range of 2c–4.5C. Questions about ‘Climategate’ and the newly emerged  ‘Himalayangate’ (the latter exposed by Dr. North’s Texas A&M colleague, John Nielsen-Gammon) are expected to be covered in the question/answer period after the scientists’ formal 30-minute presentations.

[DIRECTIONS McMurtry Auditorium is located in Duncan Hall. Visitor parking is available to anyone with a credit card.  Visitor Parking “L” and Founder’s Court Visitor are the closest to Duncan Hall, in particular using the Rice main entrance on South Main Street at Sunset Blvd. Another parking lot is the North Lot, 5-8 min walk to Duncan Hall, on Rice blvd using entrance # 21 or 20.

Rice campus map: http://www.rice.edu/maps/maps.html]

Having this climate debate is very good news. The last climate science debate at Rice University was in the summer of 2000 at the James A. Baker Institute. Therein lies a story….

The 2000 Conference: The End of Open Science Debate

I attended this well-attended conference. It was fair and balanced in its different dimensions with ‘skeptics’ of climate alarmism present such as Pat Michaels on the physical science; MasterResource’s own Ken Green on public policy; and Senator Chuck Hagel (R-Nebraska) on politics.

What I remember most is talking to James Hansen and his remarking that anthropogenic global warming could save us from a new ice age. In his own eyes, he was making an ironic point about high climate sensitivity; to me, he was making the point that extreme scenarios can work in both directions–good and bad.

A summary of the conference carefully balanced out the alarmist and skeptical views of the issues. I reproduce it in Appendix A below because of its historical significance given where the science, economics, and policy issues are nearly ten years later.

The Non-Publication of the 2001 Conference Proceedings: Neal Lane Returns to Rice

Dr. Lane also blocked a scheduled talk by Bjørn Lomborg at the Baker Institute in 2004. Instead, Lomborg was allowed to speak at the business school before an enthusiastic crowd of 200. Dr. Lane was following the Holdren line that Lomborg was an anti-science propagandist, a view that I have rebutted in a 2003 piece, The Heated Energy Debate.

History may harshly judge Neal Lane’s academic censorship; after all, a fair debate on a VERY contentious issue has been precluded for many years for students and members of the public who trust the Baker Institute. And the question must be asked: would James A. Baker himself approve of this bias coming from one gatekeeper?

A New Beginning for Lane/the Baker Institute?

Perhaps, just perhaps, the new scientific and political climate will inspire the Baker Institute to join the other campus groups Shell Center for Sustainability and the Center for the Study of Environment and Society in open, two-sided debate. I hope this Wednesday night’s discussion will be well attended and will inspire a new beginning in this regard. 

APPENDIX: “GLOBAL WARMING: SCIENCE AND POLICY” CONFERENCE

As published in the January 2001 “Baker Institute Report” (no. 15)

Conference coordinators were Peter Hartley, chairman of economics; Andre Droxler, associate professor of geology and geophysics; and Kenneth Medlock, Baker Institute Scholar.

SUMMARY: “The following questions were identified as important to [the physical science debate]:

• What explains the divergence between measured temperature
trends at different levels of the atmosphere and in different
hemispheres or locations? Are some of the measures faulty, or
do the GCMs need to be modified to explain real differences?

• What does change in the stratosphere imply about climate at
the surface?

• What role do oceans play, both as a sink and as a global thermostat,
and how can they be included better in climate models?

• What is the role of the sun in the earth’s climate?

• How might clouds be included in models better than they are at
present?

• What does the geological record tell us about global warming?

• Can the development of better geological records help predict
rapid (a decade or less) changes in climate?

• What are the odds of a sudden catastrophic event, and what
might the warning signs be?

• How does CO2 compare with soot and other GHGs as a source
of temperature change?”

The scientific, economic, and political issues surrounding global warming were debated extensively a a Baker Institute conference September 6–8, 2000. Titled “Global Warming: Science and Policy,” the conference featured experts from diverse fields, such as atmospheric physics, astronomy, biology, economics, geology, oceanography, and politics, who offered their perspectives on this contentious scientific and political issue.

A central question of the conference was to what extent human activity affects climates at the global level. The costs and benefits of possible climate change were discussed, along with the geographic distribution of those effects. The feasibility and costs of mitigating human influences on the global climate also were considered.

The accumulation in the atmosphere of greenhouse gases (GHGs), such as carbon dioxide (CO2), now is seen as a greater threat to human welfare than are air and water pollution. Unlike many air or water pollutants, CO2 emissions are an unavoidable byproduct of fossil fuel combustion and, therefore, of modern economic activity. Over the past 100 years, industrial activity, the demand for electricity, and the demand for transportation services have
increased exponentially. The degree to which humans rely on fossil fuels is indicated by the fact that in 1997 fossil fuels provided about 86 percent of primary energy requirements globally. As a result, since 1958 the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere has risen about 14 percent and is now about 30 percent above pre-industrial levels.

Furthermore, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) currently estimates that CO2 concentrations will rise during the next century to a level 90 percent above pre-industrial levels.

Although CO2 does not harm humans in the way that nitrous or sulfurous oxides do, some argue that the accumulation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere will warm the earth’s climate. A positive
correlation, since about 1970, between the rising atmospheric concentration of CO2 and rising average temperatures has led [to the] … hypothesis, referred to as the “greenhouse effect,” [in that] CO2 and other greenhouse gases absorb some of the infrared radiation that is emitted from the earth’s surface after the sun warms it. This, in turn, warms the atmosphere, thereby increasing the amount of water vapor. Increased water vapor then can amplify the effect of CO2 to produce noticeable temperature increases.

The fact that most warming is caused by higher humidity explains why the largest predicted temperature increases are at night in the cold winter air masses found in the polar regions. Since the coldest air masses are also the driest, they experience the largest percentage increases in humidity.

In contrast, increased humidity at tropical and temperate latitudes produces an increase in cloud cover, which tends to cool the atmosphere by reflecting incoming solar radiation. At temperate latitudes, higher humidity increases winter snowfall, which again reduces the absorption of incoming solar radiation.

Many factors apart from the role of water vapor were identified to complicate the modeling of global climates. For example, the net effects of the initial increase in temperature produced by CO2 are complicated by interactions between the atmosphere and the oceans. In particular, the oceans’ ability to store heat, and thereby regulate the earth’s climate, is largely unknown. There also is much to learn about the effects of upper atmospheric disturbances
on the climate. For example, ozone depletion and changes in stratospheric winds were pointed to as having significant effects on climate.

Another complication is that increased CO2 can stimulate plant growth and, more generally, biosphere productivity. Since carbon compounds form a large part of living organisms, an expansion of the biosphere would tend to reduce CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere.

The existence of these types of competing factors makes the likely consequences of increased greenhouse gas concentrations difficult to predict. The only feasible way of making such predictions is to build complicated global computer models (the GCMs) that simulate the interactions among the various processes.

There is general agreement that the earth’s surface has been warming in recent decades, but uncertainty remains as to how much warming has resulted from increased CO2 and how much warming has resulted from other forcing phenomena. For example, it was argued that variation in solar activity could explain much of what has been observed in the surface temperature record. In addition, it was argued that control of greenhouse gases that are more potent than CO2 could be the most effective and easily implemented means of combating global warming.

There also is considerable uncertainty about the degree to which temperatures will rise over the next century. An increase in average temperatures of 2.o C by 2100 was the median projection in the 1995 IPCC report. This figure is 23 percent below the IPCC’s 1992 median projection, 38 percent below its 1990 median projection, and 75 percent below the figure projected at the Toronto conference of 1988, the year the IPCC was created. The instability
of the projections (a 75 percent drop in seven years, and almost 40 percent in five) is an indication of the uncertainty of climate science.

In fact, it was recognized throughout the conference that today’s GCMs are inadequate, as indicated by the wide variability in the predictions of different models. However, it was argued that there is something to be learned by the fact that all of the GCMs are broadly consistent in predicting a warming trend.

The damage caused by global warming, were it to eventuate, could be considerable. For example, melting of land-based polar ice caps, combined with thermal expansion of the world’s oceans, could raise sea levels and flood many of the world’s port cities. In addition, adjusting to rising sea levels could be difficult because
the change could occur abruptly. Initially, warming may cause a gradual melting of ice, but if large chunks of land-based ice fall into the ocean, they will melt more rapidly. Apart from the impact this would have on sea levels, the resulting influx of fresh water into the oceans could affect the circulation of ocean currents, producing further changes in climates.

There is geological evidence that suggests the world’s climate can switch rapidly from one stable state to another. Damage is likely to be greater when changes occur abruptly. The amount of CO2 that must accumulate before a catastrophic event would occur, however, is unknown. The timing and severity of any potential damage, therefore, are also difficult to predict.

Despite the uncertainties surrounding the causes and ramifications of global warming, governments are being urged to act. An international agreement, known as the Kyoto Protocol and as of yet to be ratified by any of its signatories, calling for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions was signed in 1997. The Kyoto Protocol specifies a greenhouse gas emissions target of between 5 percent and 8 percent below 1990 levels by 2008–2012 for a group of industrialized nations (referred to as Annex I countries). Carbon taxes or direct controls could be used to achieve these targets, but they are likely to be very costly. Costs also will be higher the faster controls are enforced since reducing emissions in the short term generally requires reducing production, causing some degree of capital obsolescence.

Relatively low-cost methods of control, such as land use changes, the clean-development mechanism (CDM), and emissions permit trading, have been proposed, but methods of implementation have yet to be worked out. The methods of control and the speed of enforcement will determine the magnitude of the costs of compliance. Countries also may incur lower costs if weak enforcement allows controls to be evaded.

Modeling the economic cost of taking CO2 abatement measures is just as difficult as modeling the climate. Uncertainty pervades the exercise, due to a number of problems. The lack of clearly defined guidelines for reducing CO2 emissions, an inadequate understanding of the potential of new technologies, and more conventional problems of projecting economic growth, the composition of fossil fuel use, and projecting energy prices each contributes to this uncertainty.

Therefore, while we cannot be certain whether or not global warming is an immediate and serious threat, we also cannot be certain about the economic costs of taking steps to eliminate an uncertain threat.

A potential solution to the global warming problem lies in the wake of the development and implementation of new technologies. Energy sources such as solar power, fuel cells, hybrid technologies, and so forth could greatly increase efficiency of fossil fuel use or could eliminate it altogether. Computer technologies also have the potential to increase energy efficiency by more adequately regulating manufacturing facilities and the like. This could considerably reduce CO2 emissions without imposing high economic cost. However, the time horizon for cost competitive implementation is uncertain, and, if too far into the future, damages from global warming could be high.

In addition to the panel of experts in their respective fields at the conference, four keynote speakers addressed the participants and attendees, each presenting his own perspective on the issues at hand.

Neal Lane, assistant to the U.S. president for science and technology and director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, addressed the difficulties with reconciling science and policy. He noted that science must advance in understanding how climate has changed in the past and how it will change in the future so that an accurate assessment of human activity can be made. He recognized the large amount of uncertainty in predicting future climates but presented evidence of the correlation between global temperature and atmospheric CO2 levels.

Lane also presented possible climate-change impacts on different regions of the U.S., as predicted by different GCMs, that are, as he argued, aimed at raising the awareness of groups and individuals. He also stressed the global nature of climate change and argued that the largest impact on the U.S. could come from climate-related disruptions in other parts of the world.

Finally, Lane recognized that policy will move forward, as it operates on a different time frame than does science. So, the best possible science needs to be communicated to policymakers as it becomes available.

Richard Burt, former ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany and assistant secretary of State for Europe, addressed issues of international sovereignty. Recognizing that a global agreement to abate CO2 emissions will require the formation of an international regulatory body, he questioned if governments should cede power to a new system of global governance. He argued that a United Nations-type body would be inefficient and, perhaps more important, would hold no democratic accountability. Thus, Burt claimed, any such body that attempted to wield power would be rejected, particularly in the U.S., because it is anti-democratic in nature.

A more suitable model, he added, would be one in which control and enforcement was instituted at a national level so that sovereignty is not infringed.

U.S. Senator Charles Hagel (Nebraska) argued for a new approach to the issue of climate change. Citing the ongoing debates within the scientific community and the lack of a definitive consensus prediction of climate change, he claimed that radical and swift action to abate CO2, such as that called for in the Kyoto Protocol, is unnecessary. Hagel also added that such action could cause detriment to the U.S. economy that outweighs any benefit.

He argued instead for a cautious approach that would allow for the advancement of climate science while preserving economic well-being.

Robert Curl, the Harry C. and Olga K. Wiess Professor of Natural Sciences at Rice and a 1996 Nobel laureate for chemistry, acknowledged that science often identifies problems that require a policy response but offers no clear means of dealing with those problems. According to Curl, the global warming issue is just one in a number of such issues. He emphasized the need for consensus within the scientific community so that clear policy direction can be
formed. He recognized, as Lane did, that policy will move forward regardless of the state of science; thus, accurate and sound science is all the more necessary. Although a clear policy agenda did not emerge from the conference, substantial agreement was reached on several points. Better measures of temperatures at ground level are a top policy priority and could be attained relatively cheaply.

Given time, the rethink will go mainstream. Scientists are truth seekers at heart, but an entrenched mainstream of climate scientists–so many of them friends and political allies–will need to be nudged out of their denialism.

Old voices are challenging their ‘mainstream’ colleagues, and new voices are coming forth. I have seen this clearly here in Houston (examples below), and I expect it is happening elsewhere.

Consider what Andy Revkin, the recently retired climate-change science writer at the New York Times, told the public editor at the Times regarding Climategate: “Our coverage, looked at in toto, has never bought the catastrophe conclusion and always aimed to examine the potential for both overstatement and understatement.”

Sounds like the Times will report both sides of the issue now, rather than just trumpet alarmism as it was prone to do in the past (remember William K. Stevens?). Joe Romm at Climate Progress (Center for American Progress) is furious at this development, but just maybe over-the-top Joe has himself to blame for getting Revkin and the like to want to report on both sides more than ever before. And Romm himself is now considered damaged goods by the Left, thanks to the four-part expose by the Breakthrough Institute.

Climategate, in short, is making quite a difference. But much more courage is needed.

Dr. Michelle Foss (University of Texas at Austin)

Consider Michelle Michot Foss, an internationally respected energy economist with the University of Texas at Austin who is past president of both the U.S. Association for Energy Economics (2001) and the International Association for Energy Economics (2003). Her December 8th letter to the New York Times read:

To the Editor:

Your editorial concludes, “It is also important not to let one set of purloined e-mail messages undermine the science and the clear case for action, in Washington and in Copenhagen.”

Hold on a minute. It was precisely because “one set” of opinions has been driving climate politics that the whistleblowers, not hackers, published the evidence. And it is precisely because of the type of coverage that The New York Times and other mainstream news organizations are giving the whistleblowing incident that the integrity of both the scientific and journalistic communities is being threatened.

Honest questions have been raised and honest attempts have been made to shed light on questionable claims about climate science for decades. We need to push for greater disclosure, more scrutiny, better research and a halt in the action before we jump into policy and regulatory schemes that we will deeply regret.

Dr. Foss has kept her views somewhat under wraps given her university position, but Climategate was enough for her to go public in the above very public way.  And she has received a number of emails of support–and some emails by her alarmist friends to the effect: ‘gosh Michelle, I agree with you on Climategate, but I thought you were one of us….’

To such critics, her answer can be: Climategate proves that alarmism is exaggerated, and most modest warming scenarios win the debate for adaptation over mitigation. Robert Murphy has made this point in a post very widely read among economists and entitled “Apologist Responses to Climategate Misconstrue Real Issues.”

I think that if some on the UT-Austin faculty were to try to silence her powerful voice, they would have a (climate) McCarthyism issue on their hands post Climategate. What a difference compared to several months ago!

Dr. Neil Frank

Also consider the case of Dr. Neil Frank, a former director of the National Hurricane Center in Miami and a weather forecaster at KHOU-Channel 11 in Houston. He previously did not want to enter the climate fray for fear of being marginalized by the mainstream–including the hometown Houston Chronicle, whose editorial board is a bastion of alarmism, except for their science writer Eric Berger (skeptical of Gore-type alarmism) and business columnist Loren Steffy (anti cap-and-trade).

Dr. Frank just published an op-ed in the Houston Chronicle, Climategate: You Should be Steamed, where he explains why the silent majority in his profession have been mistreated by the academic mainstream/IPCC crowd. (His op-ed is reprinted as an appendix below.)

Dr. Peter Hartley (Rice University): Courage Following Berger’s Courage

It is a sad state of affairs–a Climategate-like situation–when a tenured, chair professor has to sneak his skeptical views about climate alarmism into the public debate. But this is the situation for Peter Hartley at Rice University, and specifically at the James A. Baker Institute where Dr. Neal Lane, a former Clinton Administration official and confidant of Obama science advisor John Holdren (who has been featured at climate events at Baker without balance on the other side) has shut down debate on the physical science of climate change.

Dr. Hartley has been beaten down at Baker for years, and he is full of stories about how other Rice University professors have concerns about climate models (and the ”hockey stick” work of Climategater Michael Mann) but have stayed quiet because so much government funding is at stake. I have been present at a meeting of the Houston Chronicle editorial board where Dr. Hartley lamented the situation at the Baker Institute on climate-change science. The editors may not have taken note, but Chronicle science writer Eric Berger did. And it was Berger who mustered up a bit of courage to write a telling blog on feeling duped by Al Gore and climate alarmism. And as a comment on Berger’s blog, Hartley came out of the closet to note:

Eric,

First, thank you for maintaining an open mind on this subject. It is unfortunate one has to say that, but certain groups have worked to make it very hard to do so, or at least to admit to it in public.

Second, as a science writer for a major newspaper I think you should ponder the policy implications if natural climate change is more significant than was thought and can dominate the effects of CO2. It ought to make adaptation strategies more attractive since they can protect against climate shocks whatever the source while limiting the build-up of CO2 world-wide (assuming it can be done any time soon) can at best protect against just one source of climate change. This case is further strengthened [if], as is almost surely the case, additional CO2 in the atmosphere has direct benefits for plants and thus for agriculture, ecosystem productivity, greening of the deserts and much else besides. Good adaptation strategies would allow those benefits to be retained while controlling the costs of climate effects.

Fortunately, a thaw is in the air, as a climate discussion/debate has been planned for the evening of Wednesday January 27th at Rice University (but not at the Baker Institute!) between skeptic Richard Lindzen of MIT and Jerry North of Texas A&M.  Stay tuned.

Mini-Climategates?

The emergence of new voices is an important development brought on by Climategate. But other voices are still intimidated into silence. There have been mini-climategates at a lot of places, including top universities (email releases anyone?).

It is time for science and ideology to come clean in what could and should be a new era of transparency for physical science and associated public policy. Climate alarmism and the whole neo-Malthusian worldview toward population, resources, etc. needs a full pro/con hearing.

May the best science and public policy win!

 APPENDIX: DR. NEIL FRANK ON CLIMATEGATE 

• Wind power is an intermittent electricity technology, dependent on when the wind blows to turn the turbine blades, and, on average, currently has only about a 25 percent capacity factor[1], and, in the best areas, a 35 to 40 percent capacity factor.[2] Wind also currently represents only 1 percent of our electricity generation and 0.3 percent of our energy.[3] Most of the natural-gas fired capacity added since the late 1980s has been combined cycle with much higher capacity factors and availability of 88 percent.[4] How does the Pickens Plan expect to use wind to replace natural gas given the difference in technology, and what form of power will be used as back-up when the wind isn’t blowing?

• Wind facilities are often hundreds of miles away from consumers, and require massive investments in transmission lines to deliver electricity from the facility to the power grid with line losses close to 10 percent, further reducing the energy available. Texas State officials, for example, recently approved a $4.9 billion wind power project that will add more than 2,000 miles of heavy duty transmission lines from wind centers in West Texas to major population hubs in Austin, Dallas-Fort Worth, and Houston, among others, which will result in a $4 a month increase in the electricity bills of each and every Texas consumer.[5] How does the Pickens Plan cover the needed investment in transmission costs, and is this surcharge in the best interests of consumers?

• The U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) report 20% Wind Energy by 2030 (2008) envisioned production that is significantly more than the generation level that the Energy Information Administration is projecting.[6] This would require, according to the DOE, 293 gigawatts of new wind capacity (or over 13,000 megawatts of new wind turbines) each year. This growth level—each and every year—almost equals the total installed wind capacity in the U.S. in 2007.[7] This growth in wind turbine capacity would require siting wind units on publicly owned lands where a large percentage of the development sites are located, continued taxpayer-funded subsidies, the building of power lines to remote areas where wind turbines are located, and the public acceptance of noise and other wind-related effects. [8] Where is this level of wind investment expected to come from? Will the technology and expertise be available? Will the “not-in-my-back-yard” syndrome affect the public’s acceptance?

• The cost of retrofitting the existing fleets of vehicles to natural gas will cost consumers more either in terms of buying a new vehicle or in converting an existing vehicle. Honda’s costs for a new gas-fired Civic are $6,000 more than its gas-fueled Civic[9] and the costs of converting an existing automobile to natural gas average around $12,000. Are Government mandates that require manufacturers to produce mostly natural gas-fueled vehicles expected to force consumers into buying them? Since less than 1 percent of the current retail service stations have natural gas facilities[10], who will pay the costs of converting the retail service stations to natural gas? How will consumers react to the fact that half of a natural gas-vehicle’s truck space is needed for the natural gas tank?[11]

• Oil prices have fallen by two-thirds since this summer’s high of $147 per barrel. While this low price is not expected to continue once the world economies rebound, natural gas prices have not fallen by the same amount. According to the Wall Street Journal, wholesale natural gas prices have fallen about 25 percent since the end of 2007, but average residential consumers are paying fractionally more for natural gas this winter than last winter.[12] What price does Pickens foresee for natural gas that would make this a worthwhile transition for the public to make? Also, the U.S. already imports natural gas from Canada via pipeline and from other countries via compressed natural gas. More liquefied natural gas facilities are currently being built reflecting the expectation of more imported natural gas. Some countries, e.g. Russia and Iran, are discussing forming a natural gas cartel. Does Pickens see another “OPEC” forming that would transition the U.S. from importing from an oil cartel to a natural gas cartel?

• There are at least 5 types of subsidies that would make the Pickens plan virtually risk free. These include a Federal Wind Production Tax Credit of $0.02 cents per kilowatt-hour for electricity produced during the first ten years of operation; a Federal income tax incentive consisting of a five-year, double declining balance accelerated depreciation; a Texas franchise break allowing a corporation to deduct the cost of a wind facility from its franchise tax; a Texas Renewable Portfolio Standard and Renewable Energy Credits that require a growing amount of electricity sold in Texas to come from renewable energy; and a Texas mandate that requires transmission capacity to be built and the cost be borne by electric customers.[13] Are these subsidies and mandates needed for Pickens to invest in a 4,000-megawatt wind facility, anticipating a 25-percent return?

[2] http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/2008/07/10/pitfalls-in-the-pickens-plan/

[3] Energy Information Administration (EIA), Monthly Energy Review (MER), Table 1.2, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/mer/pdf/pages/sec1_5.pdf

[4] North American Electric Reliability Council, http://www.nerc.com/page.php?cid=4|43|47.

[5] http://www.statesman.com/news/content/news/stories/local/07/18/0718wind.html

[6] DOE, EERE, “20% Wind Energy by 2030”, May 2008, http://www1.eere.energy.gov/windandhydro/pdfs/41869.pdf

[7] Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review 2007

[8] “U.S. DOE Report “20% Wind Energy by 2030” Presents Implausible Scenario,” http://www.windaction.org/releases/16239 .

[9] http://automobiles.honda.com/civic/

[10] http://www.eere.energy.gov/afdc/fuels/sztations_counts.html

[11] http://automobiles.honda.com/images/2008/civic-sedan/downloads/2008-civic-sedan-factsheet.pdf and http://automobiles.honda.com/images/2008/civic-gx/downloads/2008-civic-gx-factsheet.pdf

[12] Wall Street Journal, “Heating Bills Stay High, Frustrating Homeowners”, January 3, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123093865371150145.html

[13] http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2008/09/26/financial-incentives-behind-the-pickens-plan/