To give you an idea (p. 15):

‘Nordhaus states that there are so many low-probability catastrophic-impact scenarios around that “?if we accept the Dismal Theorem, we would probably dissolve in a sea of anxiety at the prospect of the infinity of in?finitely bad outcomes.”? This is rhetorical excess and, more to the point here, it is not convincing. In my article I listed what I consider to be the half-dozen or so serious contenders with climate change for potentially catastrophic impacts with non-negligible probabilities[...] ?and went on to give a few tentative reasons why I think that climate change is especially worrisome. It may well be that each of the other half-dozen or so serious candidates for fat-tailed disasters deserves its own ballpark estimates of tail probabilities along with extremely crude calculations of policy implications, which is about the best we can do with potential catastrophes. Even if this were true, however, it would not lessen the need to reckon with the strong potential implications of DT for CBA-like calculations in the particular case of climate change. The fl?aw in Nordhaus?s position here is in his trying to argue his case via guilt by association.’

Anyway, some food for thought on both accounts…

Perhaps the “excitableness” of the “alarmists” may have something to do with the problems of collective action and public choice – viz., in circumstances where pollution laws and regulations provide effective “rights to pollute”, and where emissions are worldwide, how does one deal with existing rent-seekers and move the state, and do it in a meaningful way? There are plenty of private initiatives underway, and even though Austrians dissaprove of efforts to use the state, surely they can understand calls to group action, and that many of the “alarmists” sincerely believe that a fight over the wheel of government is inescapable.

Fundamental Austrian analysis straigthforwardly discussed the problems of conflicting preferences in the absence of property rights and where states are involved, but your lack of understanding or sympathy is rather striking. Why you think it helpful to label one side – a huge swath of people and organizations including Exxon and the Catholic Church – as “alarmists” while ignoring not only the institutional problem but those who profit from the status quo is rather beyond me.

Also, why so little interest in exploring policy options that you would support, like allowing immediate depreciation of capital investment and further public utility deregulation?

Perhaps the “excitableness” of the “alarmists” may have something to do with the problems of collective action and public choice – viz., in circumstances where pollution laws and regulations provide effective “rights to pollute”, and where emissions are worldwide, how does one deal with existing rent-seekers and move the state, and do it in a meaningful way?

Fundamental Austrian analysis straigthforwardly discussed the problems of conflicting preferences in the absence of property rights and where states are involved, but your lack of understanding or sympathy is rather striking. Why you think it helpful to label one side – a huge swath of people and organizations including Exxon and the Catholic Church – as “alarmists” while ignoring not only the institutional problem but those who profit from the status quo is rather beyond me.

P.S.: I addressed some of the libertarian aspects of climate change in this post regarding Jim Manzi’s similar review at Cato of Weitzman: http://mises.org/Community/blogs/tokyotom/default.aspx